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Abstract.
 This paper presents solutions developed in the ACTS ASPeCT
project for advanced security features in UMTS. In particular, a secure billing
scheme for value-added information services using micropayments is
presented. The solutions will be validated in a trial to be conducted over an
experimental UMTS platform.
1   Introduction
It is clear that adequate security features must form an integral part of a mobile
telecommunications system. In second generation systems such as GSM and DECT,
security features based on cryptographic techniques have been included in a
systematic way for the first time [1, 2]. Their success is undeniable: second
generation systems are much less susceptible to fraud than their predecessors.
However, the increasing, and increasingly diverse, demand for security by users,
operators and regulatory bodies calls for more advanced security features in third
generation systems, such as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS). It is the goal of the ACTS Advanced Security for Personal Communications
Technologies (ASPeCT) project to specify such advanced features, propose solutions,
and test these solutions in demonstrations and trials.
Some of the advanced security features to be provided in UMTS will be made
possible by the use of more powerful smart card technology not yet available for
second generation systems. This technology, together with the use of suitably adapted
security mechanisms, will make the use of so-called public key techniques in mobile
systems practical for the first time.
The infrastructure to support public key techniques will be provided by Trusted
Third Parties (TTPs). The services provided by TTPs will include the certification
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and management of public keys. A TTP infrastructure will enable the provision of
non-repudiation services based on digital signatures, opening up the possibility for
secure billing services over UMTS. In this paper we focus on a scheme to bill the
mobile user for value-added information services. Such services are expected to
become increasingly important as current networks evolve towards UMTS.
In the remainder of this paper we describe some background to the work
conducted by ASPeCT on secure billing, and provide protocol descriptions for a
scheme to be trialled over an experimental UMTS platform provided by the ACTS
Experiments on the Deployment of UMTS (EXODUS) project.
2   Mobile Information Services
A future mobile user will be offered a much greater variety of services than those
available in today's networks. However, there will still be a distinction between basic
tele- and bearer- services, such as traditional telephony, video telephony or high
speed data services, and services offering added value to the user, such as the
provision of information. In ASPeCT we concentrate on schemes to bill users for
such Value-Added Services (VASs).
It is expected that the number and variety of Value-Added Service Providers
(VASPs) will greatly increase while current networks are evolving towards UMTS.
One reason for this is that users will increasingly possess terminals with much greater
processing and display capabilities than those of today's mainly speech-orientated
terminals. Personal mobile communicators will integrate the functions of a mobile
phone, and of a laptop or palmtop personal computer. These devices may be used to
access information of a much more complex nature than that available to users of
VASs in mobile systems today. Instead of being restricted to the character-oriented
display of his terminal, the user will have more advanced capabilities, such as the
ability to display hypertext documents with graphics. So, instead of textual
information on the nearest hotels, he may be able to browse a street map of his
surroundings giving the location and images of the nearby accommodation. It is clear
that an appropriate charging scheme must be made available in order to allow users to
securely pay VASPs for these information services.
A crucial element in our model is the User Identity Module (UIM), which is
contained in a smart card held by the user and issued by the user’s UMTS service
provider. This smart card will be multi-functional, and will contain the security
procedures to access basic UMTS services as well as advanced features to pay for
value-added services.
3   Certification Infrastructure
The role of TTPs in supporting security services by means of a wide range of
cryptographic techniques is recognised in a large variety of application domains.
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Within the ASPeCT project we are primarily concerned with the use of TTPs to
support mobile telecommunications security services which use public key
cryptography.
In support of secure billing for value-added information services, a TTP
infrastructure will facilitate electronic transactions between a large number of mobile
users and VASPs in a UMTS environment, where each pair of users and VASPs who
wish to conduct transactions do not have to have any previous security relationship.
To support the secure billing services, mobile users and VASPs will each register
with TTPs acting as Certification Authorities (CAs), which will certify and manage
public keys for them.
A non-standard, compact public key certificate format has been chosen in ASPeCT
because both storage space on a smart card and bandwidth on the air interface are
strictly limited. Each certificate consists of two parts: a certificate type identifier and a
signed certificate information sequence. We have two types of certificates in
ASPeCT, depending on the signature mechanism used. The first type uses RSA-
signatures based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 [3], where the signed certificate information
sequence includes both a signed recoverable message string and a non-recoverable
part. The second type uses AMV-signatures based on ISO/IEC 14888-3 [4], where the
signed certificate information sequence is the message string itself concatenated with
a signature of the message string. Both types of certificates are used in the ASPeCT
secure billing trial.
The certificate information sequence profile for the ASPeCT secure billing trial
ignores most of the options in the general ASPeCT certificate information sequence
format. The certificate information sequence includes basic certificate information
and a set of extended attributes providing other optional information about both the
subject and the issuer.
4   Requirements On Charging Schemes
Charging for today's VASs consists of a charge for the basic service and a premium
for the added value. Both charges are based on the duration of the call. In the future,
due to the greater variety of services on offer, more flexible charging schemes for the
premium would be desirable. Flexibility relates to the parameters which determine the
charge (in addition to the duration of the call, the charge could depend on the amount
of data transferred), to the variety of different possible tariffs, and to the ease with
which a certain tariff can be changed.
The value of a particular piece of information retrieved by a user from a VASP at
any one time may be quite small. Charging schemes should thus not require a large
financial overhead in order to process the charge. Furthermore, the scheme should
have a performance compatible with the requirements of a mobile system. In short,
the charging scheme must be efficient.
It is expected that the evolution of current mobile systems towards UMTS will also
see the emergence of many new network operators, UMTS service providers, and
VASPs, which may have serious implications for the trust relationships between
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them. Thus, the charging scheme must be secure against cheating (such as
overcharging by the VASP or underpaying by the user), and the parties involved
should have the assurance that justified claims relating to charges can be proved and
that unjustified claims cannot be successfully made. This is often called incontestable
charging.
ASPeCT has demonstrated a charging scheme for VASs in UMTS which satisfies
the above requirements. The charging scheme is implemented as a credit-based
payment scheme using micropayments, although it is possible to use the scheme on a
pre-paid basis.
5   Micropayments
Micropayment schemes are electronic payment schemes that are proposed explicitly
for the payment of items costing very small amounts. The interest in such schemes is
largely based on the need to develop efficient methods of electronically paying for
items such as information on the World-Wide Web.
In most micropayment schemes a buyer purchases goods from a vendor, and the
transaction may or may not also require the participation of a broker who may be in
contact with a bank, or indeed in some cases be a bank. In our payment model, the
mobile user is the buyer, the VASP is the vendor and the UMTS service provider, and
a TTP acting on its behalf, is the broker.
There are a couple of general design assumptions that characterise micropayment
schemes.
1. The cost of communication and processing costs of a micropayment should be kept
as low as possible, since otherwise it may not be economical to collect the charge
for a micropayment at all.
2. Since potential losses over short periods in a micropayment scheme are low, it may
be possible to sacrifice the full security requirements of a payment protocol in
order to gain increases in efficiency of operation and decreases in cost. Thus large
scale abuse of a micropayment scheme should be prevented, but limited small
scale fraud may be worth tolerating.
A wide variety of micropayment schemes are emerging. In ASPeCT we are
implementing a scheme based on Pedersen's Ticks [5]. The ticks concept uses chains
of pre-images of a one-way function F to make micropayments. This idea has been
independently claimed by several authors. Similar and related schemes include
PayWord [6], NetCard [7], Micropayments based on iKP [8] and PayTree [9]. The
basic idea in all of these schemes is very simple. The user begins with a secret starting
value α, commits to the n-th image Fn(α) of the starting value by digitally signing it,
and then pays for the i-th micropayment (or tick) by releasing the pre-image Fn-i(α).
This is essentially the concept first developed by Lamport [10] for one-time
passwords, and by Winternitz (see Merkle [11]) for one-time signatures. The major
advantage of this technique is that computationally expensive public key signatures
are avoided during the payment mechanism, and replaced by computations of a one-
way function.
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6   Charging Model
The relationship between the entities in our pre-paid charging scheme is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The VASP provides information to the user and sends corresponding charge
requests. As the information is being provided, the user pays for the service by
sending micropayment tokens. The VASP is able to check the validity of these tokens
based on a certificate of the user's credentials issued by the UMTS service provider,
or an appropriate TTP acting on behalf of the UMTS service provider. As part of the
off-line payment clearance procedure, the VASP forwards billing information
proving the claims on the user to the user's UMTS service provider, who in turn bills
the user as part of the regular subscriber billing process. In return the user sends a
payment to the UMTS service provider, who forwards the due share to the VASP.
Note that the communication between the user and the VASP is the only on-line
communication required in our model.
Value-added
service provider
UMTS
service provider
Mobile
user
on-line
off-lineoff-line
micropayment tokens
charge requests
payment
billing
information
billing
information
payment
Fig. 1. Charging Model
No previous contact between the VASP and the mobile user's UMTS service
provider is required as long as the VASP can satisfactorily verify the user's certificate.
However, an existing business arrangement between the VASP and the UMTS
service provider would be advantageous in facilitating clearance of the payment.
Payment clearance would typically take place at regular intervals, perhaps daily or
weekly.
The UMTS service provider plays the role of a broker. He provides the user with a
means to pay electronically and vouches for the credit-worthiness of the user by
issuing a certificate for him. New certificates could be issued periodically, perhaps
monthly. If a bill is not paid, then the current certificate can be revoked.
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A major advantage of implementing the micropayment scheme in a
telecommunications environment is that the banking infrastructure for billing the user
and paying the VASP is already in place.
7   Charging Protocol
The charging protocol is split into two phases. The first is the initialisation phase,
where the user and the VASP authenticate one another and agree on a session key. At
this point the user commits himself to a pre-image chain and a certain tariff for the
micropayment scheme by performing a digital signature on corresponding data. In
this protocol the VASP may interact with a TTP in order to obtain certificates on the
necessary public keys required in the protocol. The authentication scheme used in this
protocol is identical to one which has been proposed for UMTS user-to-network
authentication [12]. Thus the cost of introducing the micropayment scheme is
minimised since existing functions can be reused.
The second phase is the data transfer phase, where the user pays for ticks (which
represent unit charges) by releasing pre-images from the chain. The value of one unit
charge is agreed upon in the initialisation phase. The ticks serve as proof to the VASP
that the user incurred certain charges because only the user could have generated
them. These ticks are presented by the VASP to the user's UMTS service provider to
clear the charges. The particular efficiency of the scheme stems from the fact that the
user may commit himself to a large number of unit charge payments with only one
signature. Images of one-way functions are much less expensive to compute and to
transmit than signatures.
The two protocols corresponding to the two phases are now presented. For the sake
of brevity, we omit a third protocol, the so-called re-initialisation protocol, which is
used when the user runs out of ticks while the call session is still in progress. In order
to ensure the security of the protocol it is important that if any checks involved in
processing messages should actually fail, then the protocol, and the associated
chargeable service, should be abandoned.
A preliminary version of the charging protocol was described in [13].
Table 1. Algorithms Used In The Protocol
Algorithm Description
F A one way function used to calculate αT =F
T(α0 ) where αi = F(αi-1 ) for i=1,...,T. F
is selected from a family of one-way functions f_IV(x)=h4(IV,x) where h4 is a one
way function and the input to h4 is an initialisation vector IV concatenated with x
f A function mapping points in an elliptic curve cryptosystem onto numbers in the
range [0..q-1], where q is the size of the elliptic curve
h1 A one-way hash function used to calculate the session key K
s 
= h1(f((gRNDu)v)||
RNDV) = h1(f((gv)RNDu)|| RNDV)
h2 A one-way function used to calculate h2 (K||RNDV||idV)
h3 A collision resistant hash function used to calculate a hash value before signature
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Algorithm Description
computation
h4 A one way function used in F
SigU A secret signature transformation owned by the user
VerU A verification algorithm corresponding to the signature transformation owned by
the user. This algorithm needs the public key (PK_U in this case) as input
SigT A secret signature transformation owned by the TTP
VerT A verification algorithm corresponding to the signature transformation owned by
the TTP. This algorithm needs the public key (PK_T in this case) as input
{...}K A symmetric encryption algorithm. {data}K means that data is encrypted with key K
7.1   Authentication And Initialisation Of Charge Ticks Protocol
There are three versions of the authentication and initialisation of charge ticks
protocol. The conditions at the start of the protocol determine which of the three
versions should be used. The version described here allows mutual authentication
between a user and a VASP, in the case where the user and VASP do not share each
others' certificates. This version allows transactions to take place between a mobile
user and a VASP who have had no previous security relationship.
The goals of this version of the protocol include:
• mutual explicit entity authentication of user and VASP;
• agreement between the user and the VASP on a session key K with mutual implicit
key authentication;
• mutual key confirmation between the user and the VASP;
• mutual assurance of key freshness;
• non-repudiation by the user of data sent by the user to the VASP;
• confidentiality of the user identity at the interface between the user and the VASP.
In this protocol we assume that the VASP, but not the user, interacts with a TTP.
In the general case this could be any TTP belonging to an appropriate certification
infrastructure. However, in the following protocol we assume that the VASP
communicates with a TTP which acts as the user's CA. Thus, we assume that the TTP
in the protocol has a copy of the user's certificate, that the user is able to verify
signatures generated by the TTP using an authentic copy of the TTP's public signature
verification key, and that the user has an authentic copy of the TTP’s public key
agreement key. In other scenarios, the TTP may be the VASP's CA or another TTP.
These other scenarios would require variants of the protocol presented in this paper.
The algorithms used in the protocol are described in Table 1, while the data
elements used are described in Table 2.
The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2. In the protocol description || represents
concatenation. All other symbols are defined in Table 1 and Table 2.
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Table 2. Data Elements Used In The Protocol
Data Element Description
idU The identity of the user
idV The identity of the VASP
idU_CA The identity of the user's CA
K The encryption key generated using the VASP’s key agreement key
L The encryption key generated using the TTP’s key agreement key
v The private key agreement key of the VASP
gv The public key agreement key of the VASP
t The private key agreement key of the TTP
gt The public key agreement key of the TTP
PK_U The public key of the user used to verify signatures from the user
PK_T The public key of the TTP used to verify signatures from the TTP
RNDU A random number generated by the user
RNDV A random challenge generated by the VASP
CertU A valid certificate, issued by a CA, on a public key of the asymmetric
signature system of the user
CertV A valid certificate, issued by a CA, on a public key agreement key gv of the
VASP
cidU A unique identifier of a certificate on a public key of the asymmetric
signature system of the user
cidV A unique identifier of a certificate on a public key agreement key g
v
 of the
VASP
CertChain(X,Y) A certificate chain on the public key of Y which can be verified by an entity
in possession of the public key of the CA of X (X may take values U or V,
while Y may take values U, V, or T, where U, V, and T represent the user, the
VASP and the TTP respectively)
αT The initialisation parameter for the payment scheme
IV An initialisation vector used to define a family of one-way functions
T A public system parameter representing the maximum number of ticks which
can be committed to using one signature
TS A time-stamp issued by the TTP
ch_data The charging data field, typically containing the tariff on which charges
should be based
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Fig. 2. Authentication And Initialisation Of Charge Ticks Protocol
The authentication and initialisation of charge ticks protocol shown in Fig. 2 works
as follows. The user generates a random number RNDU and computes a temporary
public key agreement key gRNDu. The user then generates an encryption session key L=
(gt)RNDu using the public key agreement key of the TTP acting as his CA, gt. He then
sends gRNDu to the VASP together with his identity encrypted using L and the identity
of the TTP acting as his CA. On receipt of this first message, the VASP contacts the
TTP in order to request the appropriate certificates required in the protocol.
The second message is a request to the TTP which will include the encrypted
identity of the user and a certificate on the VASP's public key agreement key. The
request will also include the parameter gRNDu. This parameter is later cryptographically
bound to a time-stamp generated by the TTP and unique identifiers for the certificates
used in the protocol. Since a mobile user will not typically have access to a trusted
time server, gRNDu gives the user assurance that the time-stamp was created during the
current run of the protocol and that the VASP's certificate was not revoked before the
start of the current protocol run.
On receiving a request from the VASP, the TTP forms a chain of certificates on
the VASP's public key agreement key which the user can verify, and a chain of
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certificates on the public keys of the user and the TTP which the VASP can verify.
The TTP then sends these back to the VASP in the third message, together with a
time-stamp TS, the encryption key L=(gRNDu)t and a signature on a hash value of the
following parameters: the parameter gRNDu, the unique identifiers of the certificates on
the user's and the VASP's public keys respectively, and the time-stamp TS.
From the TTP's response message, the VASP uses the certificate chains
CertChain(V,U) and CertChain(V,T) in order to obtain authentic copies of the user's
and the TTP's public keys, respectively. The TTP's public key is used to verify the
signed data string. CertChain(U,V), TS and the signed data string are then forwarded
to the user together with the following additional parameters in the fourth message,
encrypted using L. The first additional parameter is a random challenge RNDV
generated by the VASP. The second additional parameter h2(K||RNDV||idv) is used to
confirm possession of the derived session key K=h1(f((gRNDu)v)||RNDV)=h1(f((gv)RNDu)||
RNDV). The third additional parameter is the charging data field, ch_data.
On receiving the fourth message, the user uses the certificate chain
CertChain(U,V) to obtain an authentic copy of the VASP's certificate identifier cid
v
.
This certificate identifier is used together with the certificate identifier of the user's
own certificate cid
u
, gRNDu and the timestamp TS, in order to verify the signed data
string. Verifying this data string gives the user assurance that the VASP's certificate,
identified by cid
v
, was not revoked before the start of the current protocol run. Note
that this protocol assumes that the user knows the identifier cid
u
 of his own certificate.
After checking the acceptability of the time-stamp TS and the tariff information
contained in the ch_data field, the user commits himself to the scheme by including a
signed data string in the fifth message of the protocol. As well as TS and ch_data, the
data string which is signed also includes a hash of an initialisation vector IV and the
T-th image of a pre-image chain αT. The pre-image chain αT is calculated using a one-
way function F which is selected from a family of one way functions using the
initialisation vector IV chosen by the user at the start of each protocol run. The user
confirms knowledge of K by including a hash of its components gRNDu, gv and RNDV in
the signature. The data in the fifth message of the protocol is encrypted using the
session key K both as a fundamental part of the authentication protocol and to protect
the user identity.
It may be desirable in certain applications to couple the authentication and
payment protocol with the information request. In such a scenario, the session key K
could be used to protect an information field containing the requested Web page
address, for example. Such a protected information field could be exchanged during
the session as part of the security protocol, triggered by the information request.
7.2   Charge Ticks Protocol
The data elements used in the protocol are described below:
δ The number of ticks whose payment is requested by the VASP.
α A pre-image of a hash value corresponding to the number of ticks whose
payment is requested by the VASP.
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The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3. In describing the protocol we make the
assumption that the tick payment process is ongoing and that in the current data
transfer phase the user has been asked by the VASP to pay for δ ticks.
User VASP TTP
ChTicksReq
δ
ChTicksResp
α
Fig. 3. Charge Ticks Protocol
On receiving a demand for δ ticks from the VASP, the user makes a payment by
releasing the appropriate pre-image value α to the VASP, i.e. α = F T-(t+δ)(α0), where t
is the previous number of ticks released.
7.3   Composition Of Billing Information By VASP
When the call session has ended, or the maximum number of ticks per signature has
been reached, the VASP composes and stores the transcript of the charge ticks
transaction, representing the bill to be claimed. The information contained in the
transcript will include the user’s identity idU,, the signature
SigU(h3(gRNDu||gv||RNDV||idv||ch_data||TS||IV||αT)), the information required to verify
the signature gRNDu, gv, RNDV, idv, ch_data, TS, IV, αT, the last received pre-image α,
and the number of ticks consumed by the user during the current run of the protocol,
tck_cnt.
8   Demonstrations And Trials
The focus of the secure billing work in ASPeCT is to investigate the technical
feasibility and user acceptability of the proposed charging scheme based on trials and
demonstrations. The scheme is thus implemented on PC-based demonstrators and is
being trialled over an experimental UMTS platform provided by the ACTS EXODUS
project. The ACRYL library from Siemens ZT IK 3 is used for the provision of basic
cryptographic functions.
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8.1   Selection Of Algorithms And Parameters
Implementation of the scheme involves selecting which particular cryptographic
algorithms and parameters should be used. The demonstrators and trials make use of
the following algorithms and parameters.
One Way Functions Functions h1-h3 are implemented using RIPEMD-128 [14, 15]
and h4 is implemented using RIPEMD-160 [14, 15], where the output is truncated to
40 and 64 bits for functions h2 and h4 respectively.
Exponentiation Exponentiation is conducted in an elliptic curve cryptosystem,
whose default parameter values are specified in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [4].
Signature Systems The user uses an elliptic curve based AMV-signature system, as
specified in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [4], in order to generate signatures. The TTP may use
both an AMV-signature system, as specified in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [4], and an RSA-
signature system, as specified in ISO/IEC 9796-2 [3], in order to generate signatures.
Encryption Systems The symmetric encryption system used in the trial is DES in
CBC mode [16, 17].
Parameter T The parameter T represents the maximum number of micropayment
tokens which can be transferred with respect to a given signed commitment. The
default value for T is 210.
8.2   The ASPeCT Secure Billing Trial
The charging scheme developed in ASPeCT is being trialled over an experimental
UMTS platform provided by the ACTS EXODUS project. The secure billing trial
involves three ASPeCT entities: a Mobile User, a Value-Added Service Provider and
a Trusted Third Party. The EXODUS trial site for the ASPeCT field test provides
fixed broadband access to an ATM-based core network. For the purposes of the
secure billing demonstrations and trials, the VAS is realised by a World-Wide Web
application, where the mobile user is securely billed for information which is
downloaded from the VASP's Web server.
The configuration envisaged for the trial is shown in Fig. 4. The ASPeCT software
will exist on EXODUS broadband terminal PCs. A software interface will exist which
separates ASPeCT and EXODUS functionality. The mobile user will implement some
of the ASPeCT security functions on a smart card.
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Fig. 4.
 Trial Configuration
9   Conclusions
We have described a secure billing scheme for value-added information services
using micropayments. The scheme makes used of a Trusted Third Party infrastructure
in order to certify and manage the public keys required in the charging protocols.
Since the scheme is based on an extension of an authentication protocol which has
been proposed for UMTS user-to-network authentication, the cost of its introduction
is minimised.
The protocol has been optimised for the low bandwidth, storage and processing
constraints imposed in a mobile system such as UMTS. As such the design exploits
advances in both smart card technology, which make public key cryptography more
feasible, and in elliptic curve cryptography, which permits the use of smaller
cryptographic parameters. The design also attempts to shift the computational burden
away from the mobile user where processing and storage capability are more costly.
Furthermore, the design uses non-standard compact public key certificates for
efficiency reasons.
More understanding about the applicability and the feasibility of the scheme will
be obtained through a trial to be conducted over an experimental UMTS platform
provided by the ACTS EXODUS project. This trial will be conducted in Spring 1998.
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